Abstract-Wireless spectrum sharing techniques have become very important due to the increasing demand for spectrum. Hence, there is growing interest in using real-time auctions for economically incentivizing users to share their excess spectrum. However, the communication and control requirements of real-time secondary spectrum auctions would be overwhelming for wireless networks. Prior literature has not considered critical communication constraints such as bid price quantization and error prone bid revelation. These schemes also have high overheads which cannot be accommodated in wireless standards. We propose auction schemes where a central clearing authority auctions spectrum to bidders, while explicitly accounting for these communication constraints. Our techniques are related to the posterior matching scheme, which is used in systems with channel output feedback. We consider several scenarios where the clearing authority's objective is to award spectrum to bidders who value spectrum the most. We prove that this objective is asymptotically attained by our scheme when bidders are nonstrategic with constant bids. We propose separate schemes to make strategic users reveal their private values truthfully, auction multiple subchannels among strategic users, and track slowly time-varying bid prices. We provide extensive simulation results to illustrate the performance and effectiveness of our algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE increasing interest in cognitive radio systems has led to the development of the IEEE 802.22 and IEEE 802.16 h standards [2] , [3] . These standards support some of the flexible and shared spectrum features of cognitive radios. In this setting, an economic incentive might be necessary for spectrum owners to be willing to allocate their unused spectrum to other users who are in need of it. As a way of providing this incentive to the spectrum owner, secondary spectrum auctions have been proposed for dynamic spectrum allocation.
A critical issue in secondary spectrum auctions that does not exist in traditional auction settings (such as art auctions or stock exchanges) and has not been considered in the literature is the receive error during bid revelation. Another critical issue, also unique to secondary spectrum auctions and not dealt with in the literature, is the fact that participants will have to reveal Manuscript received October 6, 2014 ; revised February 26, 2015 and May 18, 2015;  accepted August 3, 2015 . Date of publication August 13, 2015 ; date of current version January 7, 2016 . A shorter version of this paper was published in [1] . The associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication was Dr. Neelesh B Mehta.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TWC.2015.2468219 their bids using the bits that are available for exchanging control messages. The number of such bits available at each step would be small, fixed, and dependent on the specific wireless standard. The framework we present in this paper addresses these important problems for the first time.
As a motivating example, consider the case of three mobile users Alice, Bob and Cynthia using Verizon's network on a college campus. All three of them are heavy users of data, using services like Youtube, Dropbox and other multimedia streaming services. While using these services, Alice wants to download a large attachment from Gmail, Bob wants to download many images from Facebook and Cynthia wants to watch higher quality lecture videos, all at the same time. The Verizon base station serving the three of them has additional spectrum that it is willing to auction. All three of them are willing to pay additional charges to win a spectrum reward of additional time slots for data. Since they are already using data services heavily, the three users can convey their bidding information only through uplink control packets (eg., PUCCH LTE [4] ) that they are exchanging periodically with the base station. Control packets are small and carry other information, due to which only a few bits per packet are at the protocol's disposal for conveying and refining bid information. The additional applications are also data intensive and are expected to take up multiple time slots. So the users would be willing to bid if they know that the highest bidder is guaranteed to get spectrum rewards after exchanging just a few control packets. Our work explicitly addresses quantization by restricting the number of bids available for conveying and refining bids to one bit per user per bidding round (all our results can be easily extended to the case when more than one bit is available).
If the users move around while using data intensive applications, the values that they attach to spectrum could vary depending on channel conditions. If Alice enters a building, then her reception could be significantly degraded and she may want to increase her bid. She would also want the base station to know her new bid with as little overhead as possible since she already has a poor uplink. Therefore minimizing overheads becomes more crucial when users change their bids, so that the auctioneer is able to update the bid estimates faster. Our paper is the first one to propose and evaluate an algorithm for this important and difficult problem.
The two previous examples had spectrum rewards in the form of additional time slots but current standards that use OFDMA [2] can be used to auction multiple sub-carriers at time scales that are akin to carrier allocation time scales. This would put tighter constraints on the number of control bits that can be used for revealing multiple bids. IEEE 802.22 contains 1440 data subcarriers per OFDM symbol, and a subchannel is a set of 24 contiguous subcarriers which results in 60 subchannels. After allocating subchannels to users, multiple remaining subchannels can be auctioned using control packets for bid revelation.
The first central contribution of our paper is the articulation of critical problems that are unique to secondary spectrum auctions, namely, the noise in the user-to-auctioneer channels; the limited number of bits available to each user for communicating its bids; and the importance of time-varying bids. The explicit consideration of these communication issues is essential in the development of practical secondary spectrum auction schemes. Our second central contribution is a framework for addressing these problems-the first such framework in the literature.
As part of these contributions, we propose several auction schemes under a scenario where there are two-way channels between the auctioneer (or clearing authority-abbreviated as CA) and the users. Our schemes explicitly account for the issues outlined earlier. In such a set-up, the time period of interest is divided into multiple rounds, where each round consists of an update-and-allocate period and a spectrum reward period. During an update-and-allocate period, each user can only transmit a small, fixed number of bits to the CA through a noisy channel. This is because users have strict constraints on transmit power and dedicated control information bits. The CA then chooses a winner for each spectrum reward unit under auction. The winners can use the reward during the next spectrum use period. After the spectrum use period, the CA gets back control of the spectrum and begins the next round of allocations.
A natural objective of the CA is to discover the true values of the users and allocate spectrum to users who value it the most. The main part of our proposed framework is a scheme called matched auctioning which enables the CA to asymptotically achieve this objective for non-strategic users with constant bids. Moreover, we prove that asymptotically, the CA's revenue can be made arbitrarily close to the highest bid. In addition, due to our scheme's small communication overhead, it can be extended to handle other practical issues which have been outlined in our motivating examples. These include time-varying bids, simultaneously auctioning multiple spectrum units, time-varying bids and additionally, the handling of strategic bidders. Our method is closely related to channel output feedback problems and the technique of posterior matching [5] , [6] . The CA is typically a base station that can transmit using a large amount of power. So we assume that the channel from the CA to each user is noiseless whereas the user-to-CA channels are noisy. This assumption is important because if the CA-to-user channels are noisy, then noise would accumulate with each round. This case is a problem of active research in communication theory that warrants further investigation.
We present a literature review in Section II and the description of our basic system set-up in Section III for single-unit multi-round auctions. Our schemes are summarized in Table. I, and simulation results are in Section IX. We conclude in Section X.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There have been many secondary spectrum auction schemes in the literature that address various issues excluding the ones we have described earlier. Spectrum auctions taking wireless interference into account are proposed in [7] , [8] and [9] . In [8] and [9] , computationally efficient suboptimal schemes have been proposed to allocate multiple channels, with the objective of maximizing revenue. Spectrum sharing problems have been viewed from a game theoretic perspective in [10] - [14] . Auction based resource allocation has been studied for cooperative networks in [15] . Mechanisms for dynamic spectrum sharing using spectrum contracts among primary users have been proposed in [16] and [17] .
The drawbacks of the schemes in the current literature become clear when we look at the close connection between secondary spectrum auctions and user scheduling problems. User scheduling is done by a centralized scheduler that allocates time or frequency slots to users based on channel quality information (CQI) and fairness considerations. The scheduler has to periodically collect CQI from the users that it serves. But if users provide perfect, unquantized CQI using instantaneous SNR, then scheduling algorithms would become impractical as the number of users increases [18] . This problem arises because the power and bandwidth needed to reliably communicate this information would be prohibitive. Therefore, many efforts have been made to reduce communication overheads in user scheduling problems. Methods to reduce the number of bits used for communicating CQI information from users include quantizing SNR information using multiple levels [18] , [19] , and having each user transmit its quantized SNR information only if its SNR exceeds a particular threshold [20] . It has been argued in [19] and [21] that increasing the number of bits from each user to the scheduler results in diminishing improvements in throughput.
User scheduling faces two other challenges due to latency and erroneous CQI. In [22] , the impact of users transmitting outdated CQI has been studied to analyze how latency affects scheduling problems. As we have mentioned earlier, delay is an important factor in secondary spectrum auction design because time-varying bids can affect performance adversely when overheads for bid revelation are high. It is found in [22] that the performance of scheduling algorithms degrades significantly with delay, even when the channel is slowly varying with time. The scheduling problem under the noisy CQI scenario is studied in [23] . One can find literature surveys on limited feedback in wireless communications and limited feedback adaptive transmission and scheduling in [24] and [25] , respectively. From this section, we see that both scheduling problems and secondary spectrum auctions attempt to allocate scarce resources among multiple users based on different criteria. Moreover, we propose to conduct multi-round spectrum auctions where bid updates are performed at timescales similar to user scheduling problems. Therefore many of the challenges faced in scheduling problems, like communication overheads, channel noise, information quantization, etc., would also be faced in secondary spectrum auctions.
III. SYSTEM SET-UP AND SINGLE-UNIT AUCTION SCHEME OUTLINE Consider the scenario of a fixed number (N ) of users bidding for one unit of spectrum that is being auctioned by a central clearing authority -abbreviated as CA. Depending on the application, the resource being auctioned could either be exclusive access to spectrum or a spectrum reward on top of a small base data rate as in the motivating examples. The CA is a base-station, and the users could be wireless devices in a cell. We assume that users have messages to send whenever they are provided the opportunity to do so.
A. Definitions and preliminaries
Secondary spectrum auctions are modeled as private value auctions, in which the i th user attaches a value (v i ) to the object under auction. These values are only known to the respective users. Prior to receiving any information from the users, the auctioneer models these values as i.i.d. random variables. In spectrum auctions, this distribution models channel conditions, user requirements, and other factors that would affect the value of one spectrum unit. The strategy of the i th user is a mapping from its true value v i into a bid price i.e., s i (v i ) = b i . In a standard auction, the i th user will win the auction if it has the highest bid. The auctioneer then charges an ask price equal to a, giving the winner a payoff equal to v i − a and zero payoff for the others. A strategic user is one which behaves so as to maximize its payoff. If a user is non-strategic, then its strategy is the identity function. A non-strategic user is also assumed to always be truthful and to adhere to the auction rules, even if deviating from the rules would give it higher payoffs. Throughout this work, we assume that the auctioneer is always truthful and does not deviate from the designed auction scheme. We also assume that the CA can ascertain whether the users are strategic or not before the auction begins.
A natural choice for the ask price that the winner gets charged is the winning bid itself. Such an auction is called a first price auction. Bidding one's own value in a first price auction would only guarantee a payoff of zero. Therefore, in general first price auctions, strategic bidders will not bid their true private values. On the other hand, for a standard auction where the ask price is equal to the second highest bid, the strategy [26] . The next subsection outlines our single-unit auction schemes. The set-up of the multi-unit auction scheme in Section VII is similar to the set-up of truthful matched auctioning. We explain the set-up for quantized Vickrey auctions in the corresponding section for ease of description and clarity in conveying the main ideas.
B. Single-unit auction scheme outline
Depending on channel conditions, individual requirements and strategies, the users fix their bids as b 1 , . . . , b N , which are all assumed to lie in the interval [0, 1]. We assume that there is a two-way channel between each user and the CA, and there is no interference between these channels. Since the CA is typically a base station with high transmit power and unutilized bandwidth that is dedicated to control, we assume that the CA-to-user channels are noiseless. The CA can award spectrum to the highest bidder of each round in one shot if the users could send their bids to the CA with infinite precision. But in our set-up, we consider quantization and noise constraints explicitly. This results in the CA refining its estimate of the highest bid from roundto-round. Each round is divided into two disjoint intervals, an update-and-allocate period and a spectrum use period. As mentioned in Section II, there are strong similarities between user scheduling and secondary spectrum auctions. Thus, the duration of each round would be similar to the timescales associated with user scheduling.
During an update-and-allocate period, the users have severely constrained channels connecting them to the CA. As a result, each of those periods is meant to refine the CA's estimate of the user's bids while using very limited signaling. We now list the steps that take place in the t th update-and-allocate period for single-unit auctions. Fig. 1 . Update period outline for single-unit auctions: Users (the five devices in black) send 1 bit each to the CA (the base station in green). The bit can be a function of the user's bid and all the other information available to the user. The actual form of x it depends on the specific scheme. The CA updates the bid and ask price estimates. It then sends the received bit and winner information back to the users. The third bitỹ it , highlighted in red, is only required to convey the ask price to strategic users in truthful matched auctioning. This bit is not needed in single-unit auctions with non-strategic bidders.
• At the start of round t, user i is allowed to send only one bit 1 to the CA, denoted by x it . In general, x it is a function of b i and all the other information available to the user until round t. Due to noise in the user-to-CA channel, x it is received by the CA as y it .
• Since the CA does not know the bids, it models them as independent continuous random variables
, each uniform over [0, 1] . 2 • Using (y 1t , . . . , y N t ) and all the bits received during the previous rounds, the CA estimates each bid and awards spectrum for the corresponding spectrum use period to the user whose bid price estimate is the highest. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
• A spectrum ask price a t is fixed by the CA based on its updated bid estimates.
• The CA then sends the first feedback bit u it to each user i, which is to inform the user whether it was awarded spectrum for the following spectrum use period (u it = 1) or not (u it = 0). This is given by u it = I user iwon round t , where I A is the indicator function of event A.
• The second feedback bit sent from the CA to user i is z it = y it . This bit is sent so that all the users can perform the same updates as the CA and compute the CA's new bid estimate. When users are strategic, the CA has to send a third bit,ỹ it , to enable the users to compute the ask price. Bits sent by the CA are correctly received by the users due to noiseless feedback.
• When users are not strategic, the winner has the option to reject spectrum and pay nothing if the ask price is larger than its bid. If the winner exercises this option, then the CA's revenue during round t will be zero, and spectrum will be unused in the following spectrum use period. If the winner chooses to accept spectrum the CA's revenue will be equal to the ask price a t . In truthful matched auctioning, strategic winners are not allowed to reject spectrum since they might use spectrum but claim to have rejected it. Therefore, they always use spectrum, giving a revenue of a t to the CA during each round. 1 Our scheme can be extended to provide more fine grained information during each round if users are allowed to send multiple bits. This would require the number of feedback bits from the CA to the users to be expanded to provide perfect channel output information back to the users. 2 We use upper case letters for random variables and lower case letters for their realizations.
• Allowing winners to reject spectrum when they are not strategic is beneficial to the winners. Although it could reduce the revenue of the CA during the initial update rounds, we prove that the revenue converges in probability to a price close to the maximum bid price as the number of update rounds increases. Not allowing winners to reject spectrum in truthful matched auctioning tackles the problem of strategic bidders at the cost of winners having to sometimes pay a price larger than their bid. But our simulations suggest that as the number of update rounds increases, the probability of winners paying an amount smaller than their bid converges to one. Despite this, it could be possible for users with very low bids to incur an expected negative payoff. Therefore we propose a method and discuss its practical aspects to preserve individual rationality in Sec. IX-C.
• The spectrum access method during spectrum use periods could differ depending on the application. Some applications could allow only the winner to transmit during the spectrum use period. But like our motivating examples, there could be applications where all users have heavy data usage needs. In such a case, during each spectrum use period, all users could be given a base data rate and the winner could be given a spectrum reward over and above the base data rate. This would be an application dependent issue, but our schemes are flexible enough to accommodate such application specific considerations.
• Subsequent to the corresponding spectrum use period, the CA gets back control of the spectrum reward and the users will send x i,t+1 , just like in the previous round. This procedure continues as long as the CA has a unit of spectrum to auction. The steps in one update-and-allocate period for single-unit auctions are illustrated in Fig. 1 . In this section, we have left out the exact equations that are used by each scheme to compute x it and a t . These will be addressed in the corresponding sections. We will also address the computation ofỹ it in Section VI on truthful matched auctions.
• In practice, the final payments can be made to the CA at the end of the auction. When users are strategic, the CA has to remember only the winner information and collect the corresponding ask price from the winners of each round. When users are non-strategic, we additionally assume that the winners remember their usage information and pay the CA truthfully. While the CA-to-user channels are assumed to be noiseless, we model the user-to-CA channels as non-interfering binary symmetric channels (BSC). If the input to a BSC is 1, then it will be received erroneously as 0 with probability p. Similarly, an input of 0 will be received as 1 with probability p. BSC p is used to denote a BSC with cross-over probability p.
IV. QUANTIZED AUCTION EXAMPLE: UNMATCHED AUCTION
As a motivating example for quantized auctions with noisy bid revelation and as a way to compare our schemes with schemes in the literature that assume noiseless bid revelation, we now propose a quantized version of a single unit auction with non-strategic users. In this simple quantized auction, user i sends one bit per update-and-allocate period without using the second feedback bit (z it ) it has received from the CA.
The sequence of bits is obtained by converting the bid into its binary equivalent. For example, if user i's bid is 0.76, then the binary equivalent is 0.1100001 . . .. The sequence of bits obtained from the binary equivalent forms the sequence {x i1 , x i2 , . . .}. Therefore, the first three transmissions from user i would be 1, 1, 0. The CA's estimate of the bid prices at each update round is obtained by converting the binary sequence it has received from each user until that point into the corresponding decimal fraction. For example, if the transmitted sequence 1, 1, 0 is received with an erroneous third bit as 1, 1, 1, then the CA's estimate of the bid after the third reception would be 1 × 2 −1 + 1 × 2 −2 + 1 × 2 −3 = 0.875. In any round t, the CA awards spectrum to the user with the highest estimate and sets this estimate as the ask price for that round. It then sends the two feedback bits u it and z it to inform the users about the result of the t th update-and-allocate round and about the CA's estimate of its bid price. Since user i knows y it , the winner also knows the ask price set by the CA. Based on this information, the winner chooses either to accept or reject spectrum for the t th spectrum use period. The winners can be given this choice since we assume that the users are non-strategic.
When there is noise in the user-to-CA channel, this scheme would, on the average, result in sub-optimal allocations even after many update rounds. In other words, on the average, the CA is not guaranteed to allocate spectrum to the highest bidder, as illustrated in Section IX-A. In order to overcome this, one approach would be to view this as an open-loop channel coding problem and use sophisticated channel coding schemes to quantize the bids so that the CA's estimate is arbitrarily close to the actual bid. Although there exist techniques by which users can encode their bids to be received by the CA with arbitrarily low error probabilities, such techniques would require large block length open-loop codes that can cause severe overhead, resulting in the CA taking many rounds to converge to the optimal allocation. Such open-loop schemes also do not scale well with multi-unit auctions and with time-varying bids. We substantiate these arguments in Section IX-F by comparing the closed-loop scheme used in our work with a state-of-the-art open loop coding scheme.
V. MATCHED AUCTION SCHEME
For single-unit auctions with non-strategic users and constant bid prices, an alternative approach to unmatched auctioning is to exploit the noiseless feedback from the CA to the users. In this section, we devise such a scheme where the probability that the CA allocates spectrum to the highest bidder approaches one as the number of rounds increases and the CA's revenue converges to a price that is close to the maximum bid price.
Posterior matching and channel output feedback problems: We briefly discuss the scheme in Horstein's paper [6] since our iterative scheme is closely related it. Horstein's scheme falls under the general framework of posterior matching, and it achieves the point-to-point capacity for a BSC with noiseless feedback. In this scheme, the transmitter represents the sequence it wants to transmit using a message point. The receiver's prior model for the probability distribution of the message point is uniform over the interval [0, 1]. The transmitter knows that this is the receiver's prior model. Both the transmitter and the receiver maintain and update the posterior distribution of the message point conditioned on all the bits observed at the receiver. In each round, the transmitter tells the receiver whether or not the message point is below the posterior median. The receiver uses this bit to update its posterior distribution and sends the same bit back to the transmitter. The feedback bit is received at the transmitter without error because of the noiseless feedback. Therefore, the transmitter can perform the same posterior update as the receiver. In the next round, the transmitter sends one bit according to the same rule as in the previous round. As the number of rounds increases, the receiver becomes more and more confident about its estimate of the message point, and the posterior cumulative distribution of the message point converges to a unit step at the actual message point. The analysis of error exponents in [6] shows that the error probability in detecting the message point decreases exponentially with the number of transmitted bits.
In our scheme, the N bid prices act as N message points, represented as random variables
. The users act as transmitters, while the CA acts as the receiver and maintains posterior distributions for each of these bid prices. At the beginning of round t, the users inform the CA whether their bids are below the posterior median 3 M it at the beginning of that round: 4 3 The median m of a continuous random variable X is defined by P{X ≤ m} = 1/2. The median m of a discrete random variable X is defined by P{X ≤ m} ≥ 1/2 and P{X ≥ m} ≥ 1/2. To make the median unique in the discrete case, we pick the smallest m such that it also has non-zero probability mass. 4 Our results extend easily to the case where each user is allowed to send more than one bit per round to the CA. Eg., if each user-to-CA message contains two bits, it would convey which posterior quartile the message point lies in: x it = 00 if the bid lies in the first quartile of the posterior distribution; x it = 01 if it is in the second quartile, etc. Similarly, n bits can be used to convey which of the 2 n posterior quantiles the message point is in. Alternatively, n bits can also be used to encode the bit to be transmitted in order to reduce the effective p value of the BSC p . The extensions for n-bit messages are conceptually straightforward but notationally complicated extensions of the one-bit case, and therefore we omit them. Fig. 2 . User i -to-CA step at the beginning of the t th update round and CA-touser i step at the end of the t th update round. Each of these bits passes through a BSC p and is received by the CA as y it . Using the information it receives from the users, the CA updates its distribution of {B i } N i=1 and its estimate of each bid, which is set to be the updated posterior median M i,t+1 . The winner for the t th round is picked using arg max i {M i,t+1 }, and the ask price is set to a t = max i {M i,t+1 } − h, where h is a small positive number. The number h specifies how much less than the highest bid the CA will asymptotically get in revenue. The larger it is, the better it insures that the winner does not reject spectrum as t increases, resulting in a faster convergence of the CA's revenue, as clarified in the proof of Proposition 2. The CA then sends u it = I user iwon round t and z it = y it to user i so that all the users can perform the same update as the CA and compute the updated posterior distribution. The winner then decides whether or not to use spectrum during the corresponding spectrum use period, based on its bid price and the new ask price.
After the following spectrum use period, the users reply back to the CA in the same fashion as in the previous round using (1) and the process continues as long as the CA is willing to sell spectrum, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . In all our auction schemes, the payment to the CA is settled at the end of all update-andallocate rounds as outlined in Section III-B.
A. Algorithm description and pseudocode
The pseudocode for the matched auction scheme is in Fig. 3 , which contains calls to functions ONEROUNDUSER and ONEROUNDCA, both of which are shown in Fig. 4 . Function ONEROUNDUSER is executed by each user i in every updateand-allocate round t, to mimic the CA's posterior median calculations and determine x it according to (1) . Moreover, if spectrum has been awarded to the user, this function decides whether or not to use the spectrum based on whether or not its bid is above m it − h. Note that the posterior distribution of user i's bid and the particular realization of its median calculated by the CA are denoted by F it and m it , respectively; whereas their replicas calculated and maintained by user i are denoted respectively by F u it and m u it . Function ONEROUNDCA is executed by the CA in every update-and-allocate round t, in order to update the posterior distribution of each user's bid, determine the auction winner, and calculate the two bits to be sent back to each user. Before getting any information from the users, the CA's initial estimate of the i th user's bid is the prior median of B i , i.e., 1/2. Both functions ONEROUNDUSER and ONEROUNDCA use the function UPDATEDISTRIBUTION to update the posterior distribution of user i's bid, based on the latest bit received by the CA from user i. The update equations used by this function are given in the next subsection.
B. Posterior update step
All the bits sent by user i until the beginning of round t are received by the CA as (y i1 , . . . , y it ) = Y i,t . We denote the posterior distribution of B i , conditioned on Y i,t , using
As stated earlier, M it = Median(B i |Y i,t−1 ) denotes the posterior median of B i at the beginning of round t. M it is a random variable since it is a function of the random vector Y i,t−1 . We denote by m it the particular realization of M it computed by the CA from a specific observation of Y i,t−1 . We assume that each user-to-CA channel is a BSC p , that the channel noise is temporally independent, and that the channel noise is independent of the bid prices.
Our model and convergence analysis in Section V-C are based on assuming that prices are continuous random variables. However, our simulations in Section IX reflect a more practical scenario where prices are discrete. We therefore derive posterior update equations that are applicable to both the continuous and the discrete cases. Specifically, we assume that the discretization interval for the bid prices is . In the continuous case, = 0. In the discrete case, > 0, and the bids are integer multiples of , with probability 1. We define m it = m it − . Note that, in the continuous case, m it = m it . In the discrete case, m it is equal to the highest possible bid price which is below m it .
Proposition 1:
The equations needed to calculate the posterior distribution F it from F i,t−1 and the bit y it received from user i in round t are as follows:
The proof with a very minor notation change is in the appendix of our earlier paper [1] and in the appendix of [27] .
The posterior update procedure is implemented in the function UPDATEDISTRIBUTION (F i,t−1 , y it ) . Its inputs are the posterior distribution F i,t−1 after round t − 1 and the bit y it sent by user i to the CA at the beginning of round t. Its output is the updated posterior F it computed using Eq. 3 
C. Convergence and asymptotic optimality
Lemma 1: Under matched auctioning, the posterior median of each bid price converges to the respective bid price in probability.
Proof: This result is based on the proof of Theorem 1 on page 3 of [28] , where it is shown that under posterior matching, the posterior distribution of the message point computed by the receiver (in our case, the CA) converges in probability to the unit step at the actual message point sent by the transmitter (in our case, the i th user). Using the notation from (2) for the CA's posterior distribution of the i th user's bid, we have the following for any ω > 0 and δ > 0:
where the probability is evaluated using the joint distribution of CA's prior model for B i and the channel outputs. Using ω = 1/2, we have that for any δ > 0 there exists t 0 > 0 such that for all t > t 0 the following two inequalities will hold
This implies that for any δ > 0 there exists t 0 > 0 such that for all t > t 0 ,
Since F it is a cumulative probability distribution, both F it (B i + δ) and F it (B i − δ) must be between 0 and 1 with probability 1. Therefore, it follows from (4) that, for all t > t 0 , F it (B i − δ) < 1/2 and F it (B i + δ) > 1/2 with probability 1. To see this, suppose that there is a non-zero probability that F it (B i − δ) ≥ 1/2 for some value t > t 0 . Then (4) would imply a non-zero probability for F it (B i + δ) > 1, which is a contradiction. A similar argument shows that F it (B i + δ) > 1/2 with probability 1.
But the fact that M i,t+1
is the median of F it means that F it (M i,t+1 ) = 1/2. So, we get:
for all t > t 0 , with probability 1. This implies B i − δ < M i,t+1 < B i + δ with probability 1 and
for all t > t 0 . Since such t 0 exists for any δ, this shows that M it converges to B i in probability as t → ∞, completing our proof of Lemma 1.
Proposition 2: For any h > 0, the probability of allocating spectrum to the highest bidder converges to one and the CA's revenue converges to B (N ) − h in probability, where B (N ) is the largest of the N bids.
Proof: We showed in Lemma 1 that the posterior median M i j will eventually be within δ of the bid price B i with probability 1, for any δ. Suppose that, for two users i and j, we have the following realizations of the bid prices: B i = b i and B j = b j , and b i > b j . Then, applying Lemma 1 with δ = (b i − b j )/2, we see that there exists t i j such that for any t > t i j , the posterior median M it is larger than the posterior median M jt with probability 1. Now for a particular realization of the bid prices, let k be the index of the maximum bid price, and let t 1 = max j: j =k {t k j }. (Without loss of generality, we are assuming here that only one bidder has the maximum bid.) Then for any t > t 1 , the posterior median M kt corresponding to the maximum bid will be larger than any other posterior median with probability 1. Therefore, for any t > t 1 , spectrum will be awarded to the highest bidder with probability 1, and the CA's revenue will only depend on the posterior median of the highest bidder. 5 5 It must be noted here that t 1 will depend on the particular realization of the bid prices: if two largest bids are very close, then it would take a large t 1 for their respective posterior medians to get ordered correctly with probability 1. On the other hand, in this situation, awarding spectrum to the second-highest bidder would be nearly optimal for the CA.
We denote the highest bid and the corresponding median after the t th update using b (N ) and M (N ),t+1 , respectively. Recall that we set the ask price to max i {M i,t+1 } − h, where h > 0. From Lemma 1 and the preceding paragraph, for any δ > 0, we have that there exists t 2 > t 1 such that for all t > t 2 ,
Since the ask price is smaller than the maximum bid, this is equivalent to
For δ = h, let the corresponding time t 2 be t h .
Case (ii): If δ > h,
P{b (N ) − h − δ < Revenue at time t < b (N ) − h + δ} ≥ P{b (N ) − 2h < Revenue at time t < b (N ) }.
But if t > t h , then
Therefore, for this case, we can pick any t 2 > t h . Combining these two cases, we have that revenue at time t converges to b (N ) − h in probability, where all the probabilities are computed conditioned on a realization of the bids. Since this is true for any realization of the bids, we can remove the conditioning on the bids to obtain that revenue at time t converges to B (N ) − h in probability, where this probability is over the joint distribution of bids and channel realizations. The last operation, where we exchange the integral with respect to the joint density of the bids and the limit on t, is possible due to the dominated convergence theorem [29] . 6 Although h is arbitrarily small, smaller values of h imply larger numbers of rounds for the CA's revenue to converge to B (N ) − h, i.e., the more the CA is willing to give up in revenue compared to the highest bid, the more quickly its revenue would converge to B (N ) − h.
VI. SINGLE-UNIT AUCTIONS WITH STRATEGIC USERS: TRUTHFUL MATCHED AUCTION
In our exposition so far, we have assumed that users are not strategic. Strategic users act rationally and aim to maximize their payoff. Therefore using matched auctioning for strategic users may lead to inefficient allocations, where the user who values spectrum the most is not allocated the resource even after many update-and-allocate rounds. In this section, we address the issues posed by strategic bidders by extending the current matched auction set-up to a truthful matched auction. We know from [26] that for a standard auction where the winner pays the second highest bid, bidding truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for strategic users who want to maximize their payoff. Truthful matched auctioning tries to replicate a second price sealed bid auction under the current set-up. To recollect, in the matched auction set-up, the CA maintains posterior distributions of the bids of each user. In each round, the CA awards spectrum to the user with the highest posterior median and sets the ask price close to the highest posterior median, which the winner can compute.
In truthful matched auctioning, identifying the highest bidder works in the same way as in matched auctioning. Additionally, the CA and all the users maintain an ask price distribution (A t ), whose median (a t ) is taken to be the ask price for that round. The CA has to send the bits it receives from the second highest bidder back to the users, so that they can compute the ask price from the posterior distribution of the second highest bid price. But at the outset, the CA does not know who the two highest bidders are. To overcome this difficulty, the CA treats the second highest posterior median as the message point at each step. It sends one additional bit to each user, denoted usingỹ it , which is equal to 1 if the second highest posterior median is larger than the median of the ask price distribution and 0 otherwise. To recall, this is the sameỹ it introduced in Section III-B and illustrated in Fig. 1: y it = I Second highest posterior median >Median of ask distribution (5) Posterior updates on the ask distribution are carried out by the CA and by all the users as if this bit has been received from a virtual user through a BSC p in each round. So, the virtual user sends the bitỹ it according to the position of a message point-which is equal to the second highest posterior median at that round-and a posterior distribution-which is equal to the distribution of the ask price. The update equations are the same as given in Proposition 1, where we replace y it , m it , m it , F i,t−1 , F it withỹ it , a it , a it , A i,t−1 , A i,t , respectively. As in the case of the bid distributions, the ask price distribution is assumed to have a uniform prior over [0, 1] . Our simulations shown in Section IX-B suggest that in truthful matched auctioning, the revenue of the CA tends to the second highest bid price as the number of rounds increases.
We have previously mentioned in Section III that strategic winners also pose the problem of using spectrum and claiming to have rejected it. This could happen when the users are base stations that do not need the help of the CA in order to communicate during the spectrum use period. In this section, we avoid this problem by not allowing winners to reject spectrum. This is to assume that winners are always able to pay the ask price, even if it is larger than their private values. There could be users whose intrinsic value for spectrum are so low that there would be a non-zero chance of them being awarded spectrum in early rounds resulting in negative expected payoffs for them. In such a case, users with expected negative payoffs could drop out right at the beginning and not take part in the auction. This is consistent with individual rationality and we address this claim through simulations in Section IX-C.
VII. MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS WITH STRATEGIC USERS:
QUANTIZED VICKREY AUCTIONS We can extend our truthful matched auction scheme to simultaneously auction K sub-channels if each user is allowed to send K bits per round to the CA. The usual assumption in multi-unit auctions is that the units are all identical, and they have diminishing marginal values for every user. A user who wants to bid for K sub-carriers would, instead of having a single value, have a value profile given by
. The components of the vector v i specify marginal values, which means user i's value for one unit of spectrum is v i1 . For two units, it is v i1 + v i2 and so on. The CA assumes that the i th value profile is jointly distributed as the order statistics of K random variables that are i.i.d. uniform over [0, 1] , and all the users know about this assumption while they mimic the CA's computations. Even if the users generate their bids using a different distribution, our simulation results in Sec. IX-B would still hold.
A strategy in this case is (
, which maps the value vector into a bid vector. The components of the bid vector are equal to marginal bid prices. The multi-unit analogue of a second price auction is called Vickrey auction, where the top K bids are awarded one unit of spectrum each, and if user i is awarded k i units of spectrum, then it is charged an amount equal to the k i highest losing bids excluding its own bids. The payoff of the user i is therefore its value for k i units minus the ask price that it is charged. For example, if there are four units of spectrum and four users with bid profiles (21, 15, 5, 3) , (32, 18, 15, 10) , (25, 23, 15, 12) , and (30, 20, 10, 8) , then the top four bids are 32, 30, 25, 23. So user 1 gets zero units, user 2 gets one unit, user 3 gets two units and user 4 gets one unit. In this example, user 1 gets nothing and pays nothing. User 2 pays 21, user 3 pays 21+20 = 41, and user 4 pays 21 as per the payment rules stated before. The payoffs of the users are respectively equal to 0, 11, 7 and 9. It can be shown that for a Vickrey auction, the truthful strategy given by (s i1 (v i1 ) , . . . , [26] .
Quantized Vickrey auctions can be implemented similarly to truthful matched auctions, but with a few more modifications. The first difference here is that for each user, posterior updates are carried out on each of the K marginal bids, whose prior is assumed by the CA to be the order statistics of K independent and uniform random variables over [0, 1] . Secondly, each user has a separate ask price that takes values in [0, K ]. Thus, each user maintains and updates a separate ask price distribution that is apriori uniform over [0, K ]. Thirdly, in each round, the i th user sends K -bit vector x it , whose components are calculated using the corresponding marginal bid and the corresponding posterior median. More explicitly, the k th component of x it is I k th marginal bid of user i>Posterior median of k th marginal bid of user i .
These K bits are used to update the K marginal bid posteriors of user i. Fourthly, the CA sends 2K + 1 feedback bits to each user. The first K of these bits are equal to y it , whose components are the K received bits so that the users can perform the same updates as the CA. The next K bits are denoted using u it .
The k th component of u it denotes whether the i th user won the k th unit of spectrum or not. The updated bid price estimates are used to decide the winners and the ask price for that spectrum use period, as per the rules of Vickrey auction outlined earlier.
The last bit of feedback (ỹ it ) is used to convey the updated ask distribution to the user: y it =I User i's ask price in round t>Median of user i's ask distribution in round t (6) While updating the ask price posterior, this bit is again treated by the user and by the CA as if it has been received from a virtual user through a BSC p . Apart from these four changes, the update procedure and update equations are identical to the truthful single-unit auctions. In the simulations of quantized Vickrey auctions in Section IX-B, the revenue of the CA and the payoffs of the users tend to the true theoretical revenue and the true payoff. This suggests that asymptotically, it is weakly dominant for each user to truthfully reveal its value profile.
VIII. MATCHED AUCTIONING WITH TIME-VARYING BIDS
In this section, we return to the matched auctioning algorithm with non-strategic users, and extend it for time-varying bids. When the bids are allowed to vary with time, it is possible under matched auctioning that the CA becomes overconfident about its estimates of the bid prices. By this we mean that when a user's bid changes after remaining constant for many update-and-allocate rounds, the posterior distribution of the bid would be very close to the unit step at the previous price. Consequently, the corrections sent by the user would not affect the CA's estimate of the price significantly. This would result in the matched auctioning algorithm tracking bid prices very slowly, or completely failing to track them. Therefore, the CA's revenue could be substantially lower than the highest bid. In this section, the system set-up and the auction scheme are the same as in matched auctioning. Two major differences are a model for time-varying bids which we call as the bid-drift model, and a significant modification to the posterior update step in Section V-B. The modification to the posterior update step enables effective tracking of time-varying bids, and gives revenues that are close to the revenue with perfect bid knowledge.
A. Bid-drift model
For each user i, bids are represented as independent discretetime random processes B i (t), and an additive model is used to represent their dynamics:
In (7),
is independently uniform over a small interval [− , ] and q is the probability that the bid price changesin the next round. So for any update round t and user i, P{i th bid changes at t + 1} = q, and q is assumed to be constant and identical for all the users. It is not necessary that q be constant across users for our tracking algorithm to work, but a constant q helps to gain insight about the timescale of the frequency of bid changes. In simulations, we consider values of q that belong to the range 0.02 − 0.1.
Since q is the parameter of a geometric random variable, the expected number of rounds for the bid price to change is 50 − 10. Scheduling algorithms operate at time frames of the order of seconds. So the bid price is assumed to change at time scales that are of the order of tens of seconds.
B. Posterior update algorithm for time-varying bids
After each posterior distribution update, if the posterior distribution of any bid price is sufficiently close to the unit step function at the respective posterior median, then the CA approximates the distribution as another distribution that is more spread-out than the unit step function. Therefore, our main idea to enable the CA to track moving bids is to perform posterior updates while not allowing the individual posterior distributions to collapse into the unit step function. The distribution that we use for approximation must be such that most of the corresponding density is concentrated about the posterior median, but at the same time, all values in [0, 1] have non-zero density. Although the approximation comes at the cost of the CA not knowing exactly what the bid price is, we show by simulation that this is effective in achieving revenues that are close to the maximum bid and outperforms matched auctioning when the bids are time-varying.
As an approximation of the unit step at b 0 ∈ [0, 1], we take a cumulative distribution function F(b; b 0 , λ, μ) with median b 0 . The corresponding probability density is denoted f (b; b 0 , λ, μ) . The shape parameters 0 < λ 1 and 0 < μ 1 control how close F is to the unit step at b 0 . We use a piecewise linear F, illustrated in Fig. 5 for a few parameter values. The exact equations for the three cases depicted in Fig. 5 are shown in Eqs. (8), (9) and (10) collected in Table II .
We assume that at the end of round t, the posterior density of B i is f it , with median m i . For a threshold θ > 0, if f (b; m i , λ, μ) ) < θ, then we approximate the posterior distribution using F(b; m i , λ, μ). As a measure of divergence (D) we use the Bhattacharyya distance [30] . If f 1 and f 2 are probability density functions of continuous random variables, then the Bhattacharyya distance between them is given by
The Bhattacharyya distance between two discrete probability mass functions p 1 and p 2 is obtained from this equation by replacing f 1 with p 1 , f 2 with p 2 , and the integral with summation.
If we use UPDATETRACK for posterior updates, it is possible for the posterior median to be substantially larger than the bid price even after many update-and-allocate rounds have been completed. This means that if we set the ask price very close to the posterior median of the winner, then the winner could reject spectrum even after many rounds. Therefore, the CA sets the ask price to be equal to max i {M i,t+1 } − μ, where μ is the same as shown in Fig. 5 . In the following round, the i th user replies back to the CA, knowing that the CA's estimate of the posterior median and consequently the ask price, is based on this modified procedure. Therefore, the ability to track moving bid prices comes at the cost of setting the ask price to a value that is lower than in the case of constant bid prices. But in the next section, we see that despite this, the revenue of the CA is still very close to the ideal case of perfect tracking. Therefore, to adjust for tracking, we simply replace UPDATEDISTRIBUTION in Figs. 3 and 4 with UPDATETRACK shown in Fig. 6 and use μ in place of h while setting the ask price.
IX. SIMULATION SET-UP AND RESULTS
In Section V-B, we have derived recurrence relations for updating the posterior distribution of bid prices. But deriving these updates in closed form is difficult even for simple prior distributions. In order to circumvent this problem and to account for prices being discrete, we discretize the [0, 1] interval such that bid prices are integer multiples of .
A. Convergence of matched auctioning
The left panel of Fig. 7 shows the convergence of the revenue to B (N ) − h, with = 10 −5 and h = 10 −3 . Here again, B (N ) is used to denote the maximum of the N bids. We show for a few values of δ that P{|Revenue at time t − B (N ) + h| < δ} gets close to 1, where probabilities are estimated as empirical probabilities over R = 1000 independent joint realizations of bid prices and channel outputs. As opposed to this behavior, we see that the mean revenue for our first scheme of unmatched auctioning explained in Section IV is significantly smaller than the mean maximum bid. This is shown in the right panel of Fig. 7 along with standard error bars. The length of the error bars in each round is equal to 2σ / √ R, whereσ is the estimated standard deviation of the revenue in that particular round, and R = 10 4 is the number of Monte Carlo rounds over which the averaging was performed.
B. Convergence of auctions with strategic users
From Sections VI and VII, we can see that truthful matched auctioning is the same as quantized Vickrey auctions for K = 1. We show by simulation the convergence properties of quantized Vickrey auctions for 10 users and K = 1 or K = 4 units. The left panel of Fig. 8 illustrates the convergence in probability of the CA's revenue to the true theoretical revenue. Unlike matched auctioning where all the probabilities start very close to zero, we sometimes have non-zero probabilities starting at the very first round since in Vickrey auctions, we do not allow winners to reject spectrum. We also show that the average user payoff converges to the true theoretical average, where the averaging is done over users. This is depicted in the right panel of Fig. 8 . This figure suggests that asymptotically, quantized Vickrey auctions behave identically to Vickrey auctions. Therefore, this suggests that it is weakly dominant for users to reveal bids truthfully as the number of auction rounds increases.
C. Individual rationality
At the end of Section VI we stated that users whose bids are below a threshold can drop out of the auction, and the remaining bidders would be guaranteed a non-negative payoff. An auction mechanism is individually rational if the expected payoff is non-negative for all users participating in the auction. In multiround auctions, the payoff is defined as the total payoff over all auction rounds. Here we use the expectation of the total payoff summed over 30 rounds. We sum over 30 rounds because in practise, bid estimates would converge before 30 rounds and increasing the number of rounds any further would not decrease the total payoff for any user. We first estimate the expected total payoff for user i as a function of its bid b i . This is done by . Using the expected payoff estimation as the first step, we identify the bid threshold above which the i th user's expected payoff is non-negative. This step is only used to determine the threshold, which is equal to 0.19 for p = 0.1 and N = 5.
In the second step, we fix the i th user's bid as b i and the bids of the remaining N − 1 users are i.i.d. uniform over [0, 1] . But in this step we allow users whose bids are smaller than the threshold determined in the first step to drop out right at the beginning of the auction and receive zero payoff. Varying b i over [0.2, 0.45] and computing the expected payoff for each bid in this range, we get the behavior shown in Fig. 9 . This shows that the total expected payoff over 30 update rounds is positive when users whose bids are below 0.19 are allowed to drop out of the auction. Since the estimation is done numerically, we show standard error bars computed as in Section IX-A. These error bars show that the expected payoffs are positive in a statistically significant way and non-decreasing for b i values exceeding the threshold. Users can estimate the threshold offline and decide whether to participate in the auction or not.
D. Comparison between matched auction and matched auction adjusted for bid-drift
When bids are allowed to vary with time according to the model of Section VIII-A, we show that the tracking algorithm proposed in Section VIII-B performs better than our matched auctioning algorithm with no tracking. We compare their efficiency ratio, which is the ratio of the average revenue to the average maximum bid, averaged over the update-and-allocate rounds and then averaged over Monte Carlo rounds. If the CA is able to perfectly track the bids, then we expect this ratio to be 1 for all values of q and , defined in Section VIII-A. But in reality, for N = 5, we observe the behavior shown in Fig. 10 . The left and right panels of this figure depict the ratio as a function of q for = 0.01 and as a function of for q = 0.02, respectively. In these experiments we use = 1/5000, h = 1/1000, and for the piecewise linear approximation shown in Fig. 5 , we take the parameters to be λ = 0.005 and μ = 0.005. We take the threshold on the Bhattacharyya distance θ = 0.3. We see from the left panel of Fig. 10 that with tracking, the ratio is very close to 1 till around q = 0.1. We also observe that the improvement achieved by matched auctioning with tracking is most pronounced when q is between 10 −2 and 10 −1 . For very small values of q, the bids do not drift too much and the two methods are equally good. In contrast, for very large values of q, both methods are unable to track effectively. The right panel of Fig. 10 also shows matched auctioning with tracking performing better than without tracking for > 5 × 10 −3 . An alternative to the tracking algorithm would be for the CA to reset its estimates after a fixed number of rounds. But this approach would cause revenue loss in the rounds immediately after the reset which are before convergence, and also cause revenue loss when the bids of users change at different rates.
E. Sensitivity of tracking algorithm to parameter settings
In this subsection, we examine the sensitivity of the efficiency ratio with respect to the tracking parameters λ, θ and μ. For these simulations, we fix N = 5 and p = 0.05 and sweep over one of the parameters while keeping the other two constant. For the case where we sweep λ over the interval [0.001, 0.01], the results show very little sensitivity to the value of λ as seen in the left panel of Fig. 11 . Similarly, the plot in the middle panel of Fig. 11 does not show much sensitivity to θ . In contrast to these results, while sweeping μ over [0.001, 0.01], we observe that for small values of μ, the performance is significantly degraded as seen in the right panel of Fig. 11 . The reason for this is that low values of μ result in F being too close to the unit step, which causes tracking to be very slow. Moreover, small values of μ would result in more rejections by the winner if the bid price happens to decrease.
F. Comparison of overheads in open-loop and closed-loop schemes
The bits used for bid revelation go through a noisy channel. Hence they must be encoded to correct errors. Without encoded bits, the scheme would correspond to unmatched auctioning which is highly inefficient as seen in Section IX-A. The encoding can either use channel output feedback, like we have done in our scheme, or ignore feedback and use an openloop scheme. We argue here that if a state-of-the-art open-loop scheme is used, then the number of bits required for reliable bid revelation is much higher than for our proposed scheme. For simplicity, we consider the case of a single unit auction and a single user revealing its bid to the CA. Open-loop schemes in the form of block codes encode a message that is k bits long into a codeword of n > k bits. The receiver uses a noisy received codeword to determine which one of the 2 k equally likely messages was sent. The message point perspective cannot be directly compared with the block coding perspective since the message point is a continuous random variable, whereas the message in block coding is discrete. Nevertheless, we endeavor to develop a fair comparison by mapping the message point perspective to the block coding perspective here. For simulating posterior matching, we divide the [0, 1] interval into K equally spaced intervals. Now the message point is a discrete random variable whose observed value can be one of K equally likely messages. If we use n transmissions, then we define the rate of the code to be log 2 (K )/n. Popular open-loop codes like LDPC codes use the definition of rate to be k/n, where the message is k bits long and the codeword is n bits long. The code is evaluated using the frame error rate (FER), which is the probability that a message would get decoded into an incorrect message by the receiver. Similarly, in the message point perspective, we say that a frame error occurs when |θ −θ | > 1/(2K ), where the message point is θ and the estimate of the message point after n transmissions isθ . Hereθ is the posterior median after n transmissions.
One problem with this comparison is due to the usage of a discrete posterior distribution, whereas posterior matching needs a continuous posterior distribution for its convergence results. Therefore, our simulations-which are actually an approximation of the posterior matching scheme-would give FERs that are an upper bound on the FERs with a continuous posterior distribution. Table III shows a comparison of the closed-loop scheme with an LDPC code depicted in Fig. 2 of [31] . In the table, the second column shows the error rates of the open-loop code from [31] and the third column shows the error rate of the code used in our paper. The open-loop code has parameters k = 35, n = 210 and a rate of 35/210. The rate is lower-and hence more conservative-than the rate of our closed-loop code, which has rate log 2 (K )/n = 0.332, for K = 100000 and n = 50. From the table, we infer that the closedloop scheme does better in terms of FER even when we use a discrete approximation and for a much smaller block length. Hence multi-bit versions of our scheme would outperform open loop schemes and would also scale better for applications such as multi-unit auctions and time-varying bid prices.
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented a realistic micro-level view of auctions in secondary spectrum markets by explicitly modeling the process by which bidders convey their bids to a clearing authority.
Specifically, we have modeled quantization and noise for the first time in this context. When bids are constant, we have proved that our scheme is optimal in the sense of asymptotically getting arbitrarily close to the CA's optimal revenue. We have also extended the scheme to accommodate strategic bidders, to simultaneously auction multiple spectrum units among strategic bidders and to track slowly varying bid prices. Our simulations illustrate the theoretical results that we proved in Section V-C, and suggest the optimality of the schemes for strategic bidders. They further show the effectiveness of our tracking procedure and its robustness to different parameters of the drift model. 
